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Abstract 
The methodological foundations of mainstream economics have been cited as 
one of the main reasons for its failure to account for the economic crisis of 
2008. In spite of this, the status of economic methodology has not been 
elevated. This is due to the persistent aversion towards methodological 
discourse by most mainstream economists. The anti-methodology stance has 
a long presence as exemplified in Frank Hahn’s (1992) work. After focusing 
on the debate originating after the publication of Hahn’s arguments, the paper 
offers a categorization of the main explanations for mainstream 
methodological aversion. Subsequently, it suggests an explanation based on 
the role of the physics scientific ideal, arguing that the endeavor to achieve 
the high scientific status of physics by following the methods of physics, 
contributed to the negative mainstream attitude towards economic 
methodology. The relevant writings of the extremely influential mainstream 
economists Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman, reinforce the assertion that the 
alleged hard science status of economics renders methodological discussions 
and especially methodological criticism, rather pointless. The paper also calls 
for a more systematic discussion of this issue, especially in the wake of the 
line of argument that links the recent failings of mainstream economics to its 
methodological basis 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
Many leading economists have argued that mainstream economics failed to 
predict and offer useful insights to the recent economic crisis of 2008 (for a 
review, see Beker, 2016).1  There were several explanations for this failure, 
but a substantial number of works focused on the methodological foundations 
of mainstream economic theory (e.g. Elster, 2009; Krugman, 2009; Lawson, 
2012; Boyer, 2013; Bigo and Negru, 2014). Normally, this development 
should have generated an increased interest to the role and status of 
economic methodology as a sub-field of economics. However, this was not 
the case. In fact, methodological discussions concerning the discipline of 
economics were never very popular among the vast majority of mainstream 
theorists.  The negative attitude towards economic methodology is still quite 
strong, given that papers on economic method are rarely published in 
established high ranking mainstream journals. This state of affairs is also 
acknowledged by leading economic methodologists (e.g. Hoover, 2010; 
Hands, 2015). Thus, a discussion of the development and causes of the 
mainstream stance towards economic methodology seems necessary, 
especially in the wake of the line of argument that links the recent failings of 
mainstream to its methodological basis. 
 
The persistent lack of interest or even aversion to the field of economic 
methodology was exemplified by the well-known Frank Hahn’s (1992a,b) 
arguments against the pursuit of methodological discourse. Although in the 
last decade there is some interest to methodological questions (Hands, 2015), 
Hahn’s line of thinking is still influential among mainstream economists. 
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Hahn’s position provoked a number of responses mainly by specialists in 
economic methodology. The most prominent of these responses included 
Backhouse (1992), Lawson (1992, 1994), Caldwell (1993), and Hoover 
(1995). These authors elaborated various lines of arguments in their attempt 
to refute Hahn’s anti-methodology stance. This discussion had also a very 
important repercussion: it opened the ground for the investigation of the main 
reasons for the observed methodological aversion of mainstream economics. 
Although the literature on this issue remains rather undeveloped, some 
reasons that have been suggested have to do with the internal structure of 
mainstream economics as well as reasons related to the philosophy of the 
discipline (e.g. Caldwell, 1990; Lawson, 1994; Frey, 2001). 
 
However, another possible reason which has not received enough attention 
can be attributed to the continuous dominance of the physics scientific ideal in 
economics. In particular, the orthodox perception is that the scientific prestige 
of physics-based methodology with a high degree of formalism, makes 
methodological discussion and critique obsolete. This stance can be observed 
in the development of the influence of physics in economics and the resulting 
growing mathematization of the discipline, especially after WWII. The relevant 
writings of Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman furnish the prime examples of 
this trend. Fisher (1892; 1932) was the first major theorist to dismiss 
methodological discussion by appealing to physics methods. Furthermore, 
Friedman’s (1953) essay provided a methodological outline which effectively 
rejects any discourse concerning the role of assumptions in economics. To a 
large extent, Friedman employed examples from physics in order to support 
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his methodological arguments. Although Fisher, Friedman and Hahn did not 
have a common methodological approach, they shared a negative attitude 
towards economic methodology as a field of study.  
 
The paper will start with a brief discussion of views attributing the recent 
failure of mainstream economics to its methodological foundations. It will 
proceed to the mainstream methodological aversion focusing mainly on the 
debate originating after the publication of Hahn’s arguments. In the same sub-
section signs of the revival of interest to methodological issues in some 
influential non-orthodox recent work, will also be discussed. It will advance to 
a presentation of the main explanations regarding the mainstream 
methodological aversion that have been offered in the literature. 
Consequently, it will examine the connection between the physics 
methodological ideal and methodological aversion focusing on the writings of 
Fisher and Friedman. The pertinent contributions of prominent figures such as 
John Von Neumann and Paul Samuelson, will also be studied. With the above 
in mind, it will also argue that the physics ideal is also relevant in explaining 
the general hostility towards the study of economic methodology. The 
implications of this argument for methodological discourse will also be 
considered.  
  
Economic Crisis and Attitudes to Economic Methodology  
A considerable part of the discussion concerning the failure of mainstream 
economics to account for the financial crisis exhibits a noticeable 
methodological dimension.2 For instance, some of the arguments suggested 
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are focused on: the need for economic models to evolve with changing 
circumstances and the need to change the structure of economics education 
(Shiller, 2010); the misuse of impressive looking mathematics (Krugman, 
2009); the need for institutional changes to the economics profession in order 
to improve the modeling process (Colander, 2010; Solow, 2010); and the 
need for different behavioral assumptions (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009).  
However, in spite of the plethora of critical papers and points of view, there 
was no systematic attempt to seriously examine and challenge the dominant 
methodological framework (see also Bigo and Negru, 2014, p.10). Against this 
main tendency, there were a few papers which focused more on fundamental 
methodological issues such as the excessive use of and reliance on 
mathematical rigor and mathematical modeling as well as the tendency to 
imitate physics (e.g. Hodgson, 2008; Elster, 2009; Lawson, 2012; Beker, 
2016). In general, the financial crisis ‘forced’ an interest in methodological 
issues in spite of the widespread anti-methodology attitudes.3 As Kevin 
Hoover has appropriately observed: 
Economists who had previously thought that methodology should be 
avoided as a diversion from practical knowledge found themselves 
more or less openly examining their own methodology. (Hoover, 2010, 
p. 397). 
 
Persistent methodological aversion 
Although the whole debate emerging from the aftermath of the crisis brought 
an interest to methodological questions, it did not alter the prevailing attitude 
towards the discipline of economic methodology. A number of authors have 
identified the persistent widespread methodological aversion among 
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mainstream economists. As was mentioned before, this aversion is not a 
recent phenomenon. Even since the 1980’s, the period where economic 
methodology as a separate discipline emerged, most mainstream economists 
still paid no heed to this rising trend (Boland 1982, pp. 1-2; see also Boland, 
2003).4 A decade later, Bruce Caldwell reaches the same conclusion: “Lest 
there be any doubt, it should be stated at the outset that, at least in the US, 
most economists are indifferent towards methodology, and many of the rest 
are openly hostile to it” (Caldwell, 1990, p.64). A similar observation is made 
by Tony Lawson a few years later when he points out that “explicit 
methodological analysis and commentary are widely frowned upon in 
contemporary economics, especially by those working in the mainstream.” 
(Lawson, 1994, p.106). 
 
This embedded tendency was explicitly expressed and was given further 
backing by Frank Hahn in his famous – at least among economic 
methodologists – article published in the Royal Economic Society Newsletter 
in 1992. Hahn’s position concerning the study of methodology was not entirely 
novel, given that in a 1965 article he had stated that “methodological 
arguments have nothing to teach us” (Hahn, 1965, p. xi; see also Boland, 
1989). In the same spirit, Hahn’s advice to young economists in his 1992 
paper, was to urge them to 'avoid discussion of "mathematics in economics" 
like the plague', and to 'give no thought at all to methodology'. This attitude 
was reinforced when in the July 1992 issue of the same publication, Roger 
Backhouse put the question: 'Should we ignore methodology?', the heading of 
a response by Hahn is 'Answer to Backhouse: Yes'. (see Hahn, 1992a, 
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1992b; Backhouse, 1992). The main components of Hahn’s argument were 
the following: Given that economists are not philosophers of science, 
methodological issues are best left to specialists. Moreover, economics 
foundations look after themselves as there is a process of selection whereby 
economics with good foundations prospers while economics with bad 
foundations withers (Hahn, 1992a; see also Hargreaves Heap, 2000, p.96).5 
 
A number of papers sprang out of this exchange attempting to justify the 
usefulness of economic methodology with main examples being: Backhouse, 
1992; 2010; Lawson, 1992, 1994; Hoover, 1995; Hargreaves Heap, 2000. 
Most of these papers delivered arguments and specific examples in order to 
counter Hahn’s anti-methodology stance. The effect of these efforts was not 
very significant given that the attitude of mainstream economics towards 
economic methodology did not appear to have changed significantly (see 
Davis, 2003).  
 
Some recent signs of interest to methodological questions 
There are signs that since the beginning of this century and before the 
financial crisis, interest towards methodological issues has increased. One 
source of this change is the rise of criticism of mainstream assumptions by 
non-orthodox research fields like experimental economics, behavioral 
economics and evolutionary economics. For instance, the core mainstream 
assumption of independent consumer preferences has been challenged by a 
number of behavioral and experimental economics papers. In particular, 
several experiments have showed that social preferences or other– regarding 
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preferences seem to play a significant role in economic decision-making (see 
for instance, Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 
2006; Heffetz and Frank, 2011). As many authors have realized, the clear 
implication of these results is the serious undermining of mainstream 
economic rationality with the ensuing methodological consequences (for 
discussions, see Rabin, 2002; Claveau, 2009; Drakopoulos, 2016).  
 
Another source of renewed interest to methodological issues relates to the 
rise of research on subjective well-being (or happiness and economics) which 
primarily relies on stated preferences and survey evidence (e.g. Clark, Frijters 
and Shields, 2008). There is a marked reluctance by mainstream theorists to 
accept such evidence, mainly because of mistrust regarding empirical findings 
based on questions related to subjective well-being (see the discussion in 
Easterlin, 2004). The extensive use of survey analysis and reliance on stated 
preferences in happiness research has provoked the reaction of many 
orthodox economists. The predisposition by mainstream economists to 
believe only what people do and not what they say relates to the 
methodological foundations of the discipline (for a discussion, see Manski, 
2004). Although the influence of behavioral economics and of research on 
subjective well-being is increasing, they are not considered part of the 
mainstream theory yet (see for instance, Frey, 2008).  
 
The issue of the methodology of econometrics is related to the above. There 
is a vast and growing literature on the methodology of econometrics (see for 
instance, Hendry, 2000; Hoover, 2013), but it seems that this line of research 
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has followed its own course with little interaction with the field of economic 
methodology. This can be viewed as an additional indication of the limited 
influence of economic methodology on the practice of mainstream economics 
(see also Frey, 2001). Thus, as in many cases in the past, the renewed 
interest to methodological questions originates from non-mainstream schools. 
Furthermore, the recent developments in experimental and behavioral 
economics and also the recent debates concerning the financial crisis and the 
crisis of mainstream economics, did not result in a marked increase of the 
status of economic methodology as a research field (see also Backhouse, 
2010; Düppe, 2011).  Although economic methodology has the characteristics 
of a distinguishable subfield with its own dedicated specialist journals, 
conferences and professional societies (see also Hands, 2001b, 2015; Davis, 
2007; Düppe, 2011), economic methodology is still viewed as an ‘inferior’ 
research subject. As Hands aptly remarks: 
“Particularly in the United States, the economics profession still seems 
to have little or no interest in elevating economic methodology to the 
status of a legitimate field of inquiry within the discipline of economics.” 
(Hands, 2015, p.62). 
 
Therefore, and in spite of on-going criticism of the mainstream methodological 
foundations induced by the economic crisis, the mainstream attitude towards 
economic methodology as a field of study has not improved significantly. 
 
Methodological Aversion: Main Categories of Explanations 
 
The underlying reasons for the observed methodological aversion of 
mainstream economics have not received adequate attention, although there 
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are a few papers which attempt to provide some possible explanations. One 
may distinguish two broad approaches towards this important issue. The first 
category of explanation has to do with the internal and institutional structure of 
the field. In this sense, it draws from a viewpoint on the sociological aspects of 
economics (see for example, Coats, 1993; Hands, 1994). The second 
category refers to the methodological framework of mainstream economics 
and therefore, to the philosophy of science. Similarly, one can employ the 
tools of the Internal and External History of Science approach in order to 
distinguish the two general lines of explanation relating to the above 
discussion. Internal history of science focuses on the ways in which evidence 
and argument lead to scientific change. External history of science concerns 
how social, technological, psychological, and even natural causal factors have 
influenced the course of science (Hausman, 2001, p.66). 
 
Even before the Hahn debate, Bruce Caldwell supplied an early explanation 
by identifying five possible reasons for mainstream methodological aversion 
(Caldwell, 1990). In sum, these reasons were: 1. A knowledge of methodology 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for becoming a good 
economist. This is linked to the time constraint for mastering the standard 
tools of economic theory rather than to engage in philosophical discussions. 
2. Most philosophical discussions about the way to do science are irrelevant 
for economics. As Caldwell notes, “this argument reduces to the simple 
question of the relevance of studying philosophy” (Caldwell, 1990, p.65). 3. 
Methodological debates are often sterile, never reaching any conclusions. 
This argument is connected to the previous one. 4. Economic Methodology 
 11 
only interests a small fringe of the profession, often heterodox schools of 
economics. The standard perception is that “real” economists do not do 
methodology. 5. Methodology is superfluous for economics. (“we know what 
economics is”). In view of the above categorization, reasons 1, 4 and 5 
obviously relate to the sociology of economics. Reasons 2 and 3 refer to the 
nature of economics as a science.  
 
After attempting to counter these objections, Caldwell argues that the more 
important reason has to do with the influence of positivism on mainstream 
economics. Thus, he is implicitly placing more weight on the second category 
of explanation. In particular, he maintains that positivism has been rejected by 
philosophers, and the new philosophies of science make economic 
methodology much more appealing. His earlier work which concentrates on 
the redundancy of positivism in economics, should be viewed in tandem with 
the above argumentation (Caldwell, 1982). 
 
A couple of years after the publication of Hahn’s essay, Lawson provided an 
explanation based on the existing philosophical foundations of economic 
orthodoxy, thus also attributing methodological aversion to the second 
category of explanation. In particular, his central thesis is that the prevailing 
influence of positivism is the main factor for this hostility towards 
methodological discussion.  Lawson argues that positivism in all its forms, is 
untenable and this implies that the resulting dismissal of methodology is 
unsustainable (Lawson, 1994, p.128). Furthermore, Lawson focuses his 
criticism on the version of positivism popular in mainstream economics and 
 12 
proceeds to argue that the abandonment of positivism will make 
methodological reasoning in economics highly desirable (Lawson, 1994). It is 
clear that Lawson’s argumentation concerning the role of positivism has a lot 
in common with the views expressed by Caldwell.  
 
Another more recent attempt to provide an explanation for the methodological 
aversion was proposed by Bruno Frey in 2001. Frey attempts to tackle the 
issue by focusing exclusively on the sociology of economics. He maintains 
that the publication process of economics journals is the main cause, and 
more specifically, the formalistic bias of top mainstream journals. As he points 
out, “There is considerable bias in the direction of formalistic papers making 
minor additions to accepted knowledge.” (Frey, 2001, p.43). This is reinforced 
by the intense competition for publication linked to successful academic 
careers. In Frey’s opinion, there is a large gap between economic 
methodology and economic practice, and this will remain as long as external 
incentives remain the same (Frey, 2001).  
 
In his response to Hahn, Backhouse asserts that because methodology is 
unavoidable in economics, the study of economic methodology should be 
taken more seriously (Backhouse, 1992). His call for a more professional 
attitude to methodology clearly implies that amateurism in methodological 
matters might be an explanation for the mainstream methodological aversion. 
In this respect, it can be seen as belonging to the line of thinking emphasizing 
the sociological aspects of economics. In the same framework, Kevin Hoover 
in his review of four books on economic methodology, seems to adopt the 
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similar position that economic methodologists lack social standing in the 
profession and are viewed as amateurs. As he writes:  
“The argument about the irrelevance of methodology has shifted and 
become socialised in that it no longer claims that the issues raised by 
methodologists are irrelevant, but rather that some people do not have 
the social standing to raise them.” (Hoover, 1995, p.718). 
 
In sum, Caldwell and Lawson seem to follow an “internal” explanation while 
Frey, Backhouse and Hoover lean towards an “external” approach to the 
status of economic methodology. The two broadly defined approaches have 
offered important insights into the persisting tendency of mainstream 
economics to ignore economic methodology. 
 
Physics and Methodological Aversion 
 
Apart from the above explanations for the methodological aversion, the 
influence of the scientific ideal of physics on mainstream economics is one 
that has received little attention. The scientific ideal of physics is also relevant 
in explaining the general hostility towards the study of economic methodology. 
The argument goes as follows: the gradual establishment of the 
methodological ideal of physics justified to a large extent the increased 
formalization of mainstream economics (Mirowski, 1991; Heinonen, 1993; 
Morgan, 2012). In turn, the increased formalization combined with the 
scientific prestige of the methods of physics gave the impression that 
methodological discussion and critique are rather unnecessary, also providing 
mainstream economics with a shield against methodological attacks.  
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Historical roots 
The physics ideal has had a long presence in the history of economic thought. 
Its lasting influence can be seen in the following observation by Robert 
Solow:6  
My impression is that the best and brightest of the profession proceed 
as if economics is the physics of society. There is a single universally 
valid model of the world. (Solow, 1986, p. 25) 
 
The natural science ideal was present even in the writings of many classical 
economists. Examples of the analogy between economics and physical 
sciences can be found in Smith (astronomy), Cairnes (chemistry), Say 
(chemistry and physics) and Mill (geometry) (Smith, 1980ed, Cairnes, 1875; 
Say, 1803; Mill, 1874). However, the tendency to imitate the methods of 
physics became much more apparent with the emergence of the marginalist 
school. Jevons’ assertion that the theory of economy presents a close 
analogy to the science of statical mechanics (Jevons, 1871, p.viii), and 
Walras’ prediction that mathematical economics will rank with the 
mathematical sciences of astronomy and mechanics (Walras, 1874, pp.47, 
48), are indicative examples in this respect (see also Mirowski, 1984, 1989, 
1991; Turk, 2012). The views of second generation marginalist F. Y. 
Edgeworth represent the highest point of physics and, in particular of the 
methodological influence of classical physics. In his main work entitled 
Mathematical Psychics (1881), Edgeworth not only carried the analogy to its 
extreme, but also provided a thorough methodological justification.  
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The role of Irving Fisher 
The work of I. Fisher, the popularizer of marginalism and neoclassical 
economics in the US, was paramount for the general acceptance of the 
methodological paradigm of “economics being parallel to physics” (see also 
Mirowski, 1991; Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2015). In Fisher’s view, the 
increased formalization combined with the scientific prestige of the methods of 
physics, would transform economics into a hard science (Fisher, 1892, p.85). 
Convinced of the close analogy between economics and classical mechanics, 
Fisher took terms and concepts from classical physics (especially hydraulics) 
and transferred them directly to economics, also providing the appropriate 
methodological basis for their use. The origin of this stance can be found in 
the influence of theoretical physicist Willard Gibbs, who was one of Fisher’s 
doctoral supervisors. Fisher was much affected and probably impressed by 
Gibbs’ methods (see also Tobin, 1987; Breslau, 2003). Thus, in order to 
complement the arguments in his doctoral thesis, he built an elaborate 
hydraulic machine with pumps and levers, allowing him to demonstrate 
visually how equilibrium prices in the market adjusted in response to changes 
in supply or demand. Subsequently, he presents a list of terms that 
economists use, which have been directly taken from physics. Examples are: 
equilibrium, stability, elasticity, expansion, inflation, reaction, distribution 
(price), levels, movement, and friction. In addition, he constructs a table of 
correspondence of terms and concepts between classical mechanics and 
economics (Fisher, 1892, p.24, and pp.85-86). Given the establishment of a 
close analogy between the two disciplines, it follows that methodological 
questions concerning economics are not necessary since economics has 
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become an advanced science in the manner of physics. The futility of 
economic methodology is then clearly expressed in the following statement:  
 
“It has long seemed to me that students of the social sciences, 
especially sociology and economics, have spent too much time in 
discussing what they call methodology. I have usually felt that the man 
who essays to tell the rest of us how to solve knotty problems would be 
more convincing if first he proved out his alleged method by solving a 
few himself. Apparently those would-be authorities who are forever 
telling others how to get results do not get any important results 
themselves.” (Fisher, 1932, p. 1). 
 
Fisher’s perspective concerning the nature of economics and its relationship 
with physics is also present in a discussion among prominent American 
economic theorists of the period (figures included H. J. Davenport, W. H. 
Hamilton, Richard T. Ely, and B. M. Anderson, Jr.). In this discussion, which 
was published in the American Economic Review, the physics ideal is present 
and clear. As Fisher writes: 
“One of the speakers has said that economics is not physics. No, but its 
method is the method of physics, and I believe a study of physics to be 
one of the best preparations for a young man intending to enter 
economic theory. The trouble with economic theory is that economists 
have entered the field, either from the a priori side of philosophy and 
metaphysics where the proper importance of cold facts has not been 
recognized, or on the other hand, from the side of history where only 
facts and not principles have been studied.” (Davenport et al, 1916, 
p.167). 
 
  
Apart from establishing a close connection between physics and economic 
concepts, Fisher’s work provided an extensive methodological justification for 
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the physics analogy in economics (see also Drakopoulos, 1994; 2015). Given 
that the high scientific status of economics had been achieved, 
methodological discourse was deemed to be irrelevant and obsolete. In this 
respect, Fisher’s approach has had a major influence on the establishment of 
current orthodox methodological aversion. 
 
Samuelson and von Neumann 
The increased formalization of economics continued with the seminal works of 
Paul Samuelson and John von Neumann. The aim was to construct a 
mathematical economic theory so as to make it as ‘scientific’ as the hard 
sciences.7 The publication of Samuelson’s Foundations (1947) was also full of 
mathematical methods and tools used in physics, as Samuelson himself 
admits in an essay dealing with the intellectual development of his seminal 
work: 
“I was vaccinated early on to understand that economics and physics 
could share the same formal theorems (Euler’s theorem on 
homogeneous functions, Weierstrass’s theorems on constrained 
maxima, Jacobi determinant identities underlying Le Chatelier reactions, 
etc.), while still not resting on the same empirical foundations and 
certainties.” (Samuelson, 1998, p. 1376). 
  
Samuelson has also pointed out that the Harvard mathematician and physicist 
Edwin Bidwell Wilson was one of the main influences of his Foundations.8 
According to Samuelson, Wilson had encouraged him to believe that 
economics could use the same mathematics as physics without resting on the 
same empirical foundations and certainties (Samuelson, 1998, p.1376). As 
Roger Backhouse claims, it was Wilson who stimulated Samuelson’s lifelong 
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interest in thermodynamics and the realization that economists could learn 
from physics (Backhouse, 2015, p.332). Finally, Samuelson’s subsequent 
aphorism concerning methodological discourse is ultimately based on the 
hard science argument. As he writes: “Those who can, do science; those who 
can’t prattle about its methodology.” (Samuelson, 1992, p.240). 
 
In the same conceptual framework, John von Neumann, whose work was very 
influential for the further development of formalism in economics, also 
advocated and strongly promoted the use of the methods of physics for 
economic problems (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, pp.3-7; see also 
Rashid, 1994). It is indicative that, for von Neumann, even the most advanced 
theoretical works in economic theory at the time were seriously lacking in 
mathematical rigor in comparison to physics.9 As he writes in a letter to O. 
Morgenstern: “Economics is simply still a million miles away from the state in 
which an advanced science is, such as physics” (Morgenstern, 1976, p. 810). 
However, von Neumann clearly believes that the achievement of the scientific 
status of physics is attainable and only a matter of time. The following 
passage is the epitome of the physics ideal in economics: 
“Our knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is incomparably 
smaller than that commanded in physics at the time when the 
mathematization of that subject was achieved… It would have been 
absurd in physics to expect Kepler and Newton without Tycho - and 
there is no reason to hope for an easier development in economics.” 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, p. 4). 
 
Thus, by the middle of the previous century, mainstream economics had 
reached a high degree of formalism by mainly employing mathematical 
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methods and tools from physics (see also Ingrao and Israel, 1990; Debreu, 
1991; Weintraub, 2002)10.  
 
Friedman’s Essay 
During the same period, the publication of the well-known essay by Milton 
Friedman (1953) was the next major factor after Fisher that influenced the 
observed mainstream methodological aversion. Obviously, Friedman’s work 
was not anti-methodology per se, but its arguments essentially reinforced the 
negative mainstream attitude towards economic methodology. Friedman’s 
work was extremely influential among mainstream economics. As Hausman 
states, ‘It is the only essay on methodology that a large number, perhaps a 
majority, of economists have ever read’ (Hausman, 1992, p. 162). 
Furthermore, most mainstream economists seem to feel content with the 
methodological outline provided by Friedman’s (1953) essay which effectively 
dismisses any methodological discourse concerning the role of assumptions 
in economics. As Düppe remarks:  
“On the contrary, his [Friedman] slogan of Who-Cares-About-
Assumptions expressed nothing but the futility of philosophical 
arguments about economic knowledge. And only in this respect could 
the article be successful. It excused the economists’ ignorance about 
methodology and provoked the philosopher of science.” (Düppe, 2011, 
p.169).  
 
It is suggestive that in this essay, Friedman also uses the analogy of physical 
sciences in his effort to construct the methodological basis of positive 
economics. In his view, “positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ 
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science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences.” 
(Friedman, 1953, p.4).  
 
Friedman uses examples from physics in order to provide justification for his 
approach. The case of the simplifying assumptions (e.g., zero air pressure) of 
a falling body is mentioned as an example where a theory cannot be tested by 
its assumptions (Friedman, 1953, p.36). The essay is full of further analogies 
between economics and physics (Friedman, 1953, pp. 4, 5, 10, 32).  Although 
Friedman’s essay has been the subject of extensive criticism (see for 
instance, Mäki 2003; 2009), it still shapes current mainstream perception 
linked to the high scientific status of economics (deriving from its close 
analogies to physics) and thus to the futility of any methodological discussion. 
 
Physics Envy and the Status of Economic Methodology 
 
The physics ideal which has been thought to shield mainstream economics 
from methodology is in itself highly questionable. First of all, there are many 
well-known examples of major physicists engaging in methodological 
discussions concerning the nature of the field (see for instance, Kragh, 2002).  
The long history of methodological debates in physics and their continuation 
in modern physics undermines the mainstream stance. It can be argued that 
the appeal to physics serves as a window dressing for the application of 
formalism and the avoidance of methodological issues. Thus, it seems that 
the reference to physics has a symbolic character, implying that the ‘hard 
science status’ makes methodological questions rather unnecessary.11  This 
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consequence of “physics envy” has also been emphasized by Philip Mirowski 
who states: 12 
“Problems of ‘physics envy’ include a certain contempt for the history of 
economics, a tendency towards the uncritical appropriation of a limited 
range of mathematical formalisms, and constant intrusions by physical 
scientists seeking to upgrade the scientific status of the discipline.” 
(Mirowski, 1992b, p.61) 
 
Secondly, the recent emergence of econophysics is a further indication of the 
problematic character of physics-envy. Most econophysicists maintain a highly 
critical attitude towards the mathematical approach followed by mainstream 
economics. They also doubt central assumptions of mainstream economic 
theory (e.g. McCauley, 2004; Keen, 2011). Orthodox economists are rather 
perplexed and undecided as to how to respond to these challenges that 
originate mainly from their physics-expert colleagues (for an extended 
discussion, see Drakopoulos and Katselidis, 2015).  
 
It is also worth noting that the issue of physics-envy has been identified in the 
recent discussions emerging in the aftermath of the financial crisis. For 
instance, Jon Elster argued that a flaw in economics is the belief that social 
science only can become a science on the model of the natural sciences 
(Elster, 2009). Tony Lawson maintained that the physics-based mathematical 
method has become the dominant ideology in the economics academy. This 
ideology consists of “…the extraordinarily widespread and long-lasting belief 
that mathematical modelling is somehow neutral at the level of content or 
form, but an essential method for science, underpinning any proper or serious 
economics.” (Lawson, 2012, p. 17).  In the same vein, other economists have 
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claimed that the excessive mathematical modeling which comes from physics 
imitation was also a crucial factor for the failure of economists to offer insights 
into the crisis (e.g., Krugman, 2009; Bigo and Negru, 2014; Beker, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, as an indication of the strong hold of the physics-inspired 
mathematical methodology, most critical accounts of the failure of economics 
advocate the need for different and improved models, not for a reduced 
emphasis on modeling.  As Bigo and Negru observe: “…many of those 
reflecting on the discipline and its methodology, including those who call for 
greater realisticness, argue for the development of newer, improved 
mathematical models.” (Bigo and Negru, 2014, p.11). 
 
Given the still low status of economic methodology as a field, a few specialists 
on economic methodology have attempted to suggest possible ways of 
making it more attractive and more ‘relevant’ to general economics practice. 
For instance, Hands calls for a redefinition of economic methodology to 
encompass broader and more progressive areas of inquiry such as science 
theory (Hands, 2001b, pp.57-58). Mäki argues that methodology “is to be 
improved by making it less autonomous, by welcoming influences from similar 
substantive research fields so as to enrich our image of real scientific agents 
in action”’ (Mäki, 2008, p. 421). Backhouse believes that that it needs to be 
done better in the future, something which is consistent with his amateurism-
based explanation for methodological aversion (Backhouse, 2010). Düppe 
emphasizes the key role of history given “that no economic methodologist will 
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ever communicate effectively as long as the need for methodological 
reflection is not historically established …” (Düppe, 2011, p.174). 
 
Undoubtedly, the above prescriptions have their own merits. However, the 
continuing influence of the physics ideal needs also to be integrated in this 
debate. As a first indication, the prevalent notion that the hard science status 
somehow makes a discipline free from methodological considerations needs 
to be investigated. It follows that a more systematic discussion concerning the 
nature of the relationship of economics to physical sciences in general, might 
be a positive contribution of economic methodology to economics and to the 
subfield itself. 
  
Concluding Comments 
 
The failure of mainstream economics to account for the financial crisis of 2008 
brought to the surface methodological questions concerning the nature of the 
discipline. Paradoxically, the rise of interest in methodological themes did not 
bring an elevation of the status of economic methodology. The principal 
reason for this was the continuous aversion or even hostility of mainstream 
economics towards the field of economic methodology. Economic 
methodologists have attempted to provide possible reasons for this 
phenomenon. We argued that these explanations can be categorized into two 
broad lines of thinking. The first has to do with the sociological aspects of 
economics or, similarly, with the external histories of science. The second 
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approach focuses on the way that a discipline incorporates evidence and 
argument or, similarly, on its internal history.  
 
This paper maintained that the scientific ideal of physics has also played a 
crucial role in the observed methodological aversion. In particular, the 
endeavor to achieve the high scientific status of physics was a significant 
influence on the formation of mainstream economic thinking concerning the 
nature of economics. This was seen by studying the works of extremely 
influential mainstream economists such as Fisher and Friedman. The 
influential justifications for physics-based formalism supplied by Samuelson 
and von Neumann were also important. These developments facilitated the 
dominance of the now established view that the hard science status of 
economics renders systematic methodological discussions, and especially 
methodological criticism, pointless. Fisher, Friedman and Hahn had different 
methodological viewpoints, but the notion of ‘hard science status’ is central in 
their stance towards the field. The existing prescriptions for making economic 
methodology more attractive do not give much thought to this important 
aspect of mainstream economics. 
 
 The “physics envy” explanation for the mainstream hostility to methodological 
discussion can be seen as belonging to the internal histories of science, 
because it refers to the method of economics and therefore to its scientific 
philosophy. In this respect, it is closer to the explanations offered by Caldwell 
and Lawson and it can also be seen as vitally connected to the role of 
positivism. The previous discussion indicated that the physics scientific ideal 
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has contributed to methodological aversion since it ascribes a hard science 
status to mainstream economics. Thus the mainstream attitude towards 
methodology will probably continue as long as economics is perceived as a 
hard science like physics. The call (even by many critics of mainstream 
economics) for improved mathematical models in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis reinforces this view. There has been some work on the 
influence of physics on economics mainly in the domain of the history of 
economic thought (the main example here is Mirowski’s work). However, if 
economic methodology is to play a more central role, the topic of the scientific 
ideal of mainstream economics and its repercussions for the nature of the 
discipline, needs to receive much more attention by methodologists. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The ‘sense of failure’ of the discipline can also be discerned in the Dahlem Report (see 
Colander et al, 2009). 
2 For a definition and a discussion of the basic characteristics of mainstream economics, see 
Colander et al, 2004. 
3 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the state of economics and 
economic downturns, see Dzionek-Kozlowska, 2015. 
4 Methodological discussion concerning the nature of economics as a field of scientific study 
has much older roots. The examples of specialist works by such figures as J.S. Mill, J.N. 
Keynes and L. Robbins are indicative (for a history of major  methodological contributions, 
see Blaug, 1980; Hands, 2001a). 
5 It is worth mentioning that Hahn’s anti-methodology stance does not prevent him in making 
a methodological criticism of the theoretical, empirical and predictive success of mainstream 
economics (Hahn, 1992c). 
6 The physics ideal is still sometimes explicitly mentioned by highly influential mainstream 
figures as in the case of Edward Lazear (2000).  
7 John Hicks’ methodological ideal was also in the same framework given his adherence to 
methodological monism (Hicks, 1939, p.3).  
8 It is interesting that Wilson was a protégé of Willard Gibbs who was one Fisher’s mentors as 
was mentioned before (see also Backhouse, 2015, p.331). 
9 For a detailed discussion of the views of von Neumann and Morgenstern concerning the 
epistemological model of physics, see Mirowski, 1992a.   
10 The high degree of mathematization of contemporary mainstream economics has been the 
subject of much debate which focuses on the nature and method of the discipline (see for 
instance, Beed and Kane, 1991; Lawson, 2003; Dow, 2012). 
11 The ‘hard science status’ has also been offered  as a reason for the decline of popularity of  
the field of the history of economic thought -a close neighboring field to economic 
methodology-. See the discussions in Blaug, 2001; Caldwell, 2013. 
12 For an opposite viewpoint, especially against Mirowski’s arguments, see Hands, 1993. 
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